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Note:  This is mainly a thought piece on the nature of necessity and emergency.  For 
more information on any of the footnotes (sadly, they are not up to snuff even at this late 
date) or concepts referenced please contact me at jacquelinehunsicker@gmail.com.  It is 
also worth saying that if you are aware of a German constitutional scholar looking for a 
coauthor on this style of piece, let me know.  Happy reading! 
 
The Emergency Powers of the Judiciary, or Necessity and German Constitutionalism 
We live in a world that Carl Schmitt might have characterized as a constant state 
of exception.  When under siege from non-state actors who are seldom caught, traditional 
nation-states and newer confederations of those states are often at a loss about what to do, 
except that they know they must not allow the terrorists to win, to paraphrase the former 
President of the United States of America, George W. Bush.  Winning, in this case, 
would be for those enemies to triumph over countries with ways akin to our own.  
However, what can oftentimes be overlooked in periods of crisis is that in order to win, 
sometimes the leader, the general, the executive—whomever—is willing to sell his 
nation’s soul for the sake of that winning, that is to say, change the constitution of its 
people.  By constitution I mean not only any formal document, but the way in which 
constitutional orders allow the citizens that live under them to live their lives relatively 
freely with guarantees of the rule of law, various rights, and other common aspects of 
modern liberal constitutional democracies.  
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Some might ask: why would a leader undermine his constitution, much less his 
people?  In the best cases, we will assume he does it unconsciously, thinking that he is a 
savior not a destroyer.  In the worst cases, we will assume ambitions already formed to 
topple the reigning regime, and condemn him for maltreating his peoples’ trust.  But one 
would imagine, particularly in a world increasingly made up of democratic regimes, that 
leaders fall between those categories—those somewhat excusable but dangerously 
unwitting fools who make sacrifices without imagining any of their consequences on one 
hand and conspiratorial and criminal frauds on the other.  This middle group would 
consist of rather well intentioned albeit often somewhat inept leaders who believe that the 
crisis of “their” time is a crisis far worse than those that preceded it and thus warrants 
their stepping out of their bindings—the constitutional order—in the name of saving it, 
but who do ultimately hope to save that order for the future.  Even unpopular leaders may 
one day imagine monuments and tributes to their names, once the dust of history has 
cleared so that future generations can see the debt they owe to the past (see George W. 
Bush’s comparison of himself to Truman).  Nevertheless, it will be my aim to 
demonstrate that the executive is unlikely to be the best safeguard of constitutional orders 
with regards to rights.  The executive is too prone to see himself as above the 
constitutional order that instated him, partially because, for better and for worse, the 
executive is often called to act quickly in the face of danger. 
The actions of legislative bodies in times of crisis often serve to help the 
executive in tearing down constitutional norms.  First, there is overwhelming tendency in 
the face of crisis to, as American political scientists call it, “rally around the flag” and 
create a united front between the executive and legislature.  Second, as one of the key 
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pieces of the legislature’s mandate is to act as proxy for the citizens it represents, acting 
on the fear of the citizenry—often in concert with the executive—can be interpreted as 
part of their job description.  Legislators are, to be sure, further removed from the 
immediacy of crises, but this deprives most legislators of developing the skills for 
proactive thought and promotes retroactive thought—meaning, they think better once the 
crisis has been dealt with preliminarily, and thus their hands are tied in ways that make 
them less than ideal for preserving the constitutional order in the long run (cite Tulis). 
Most examples of judicial action—or, rather, inaction—in the immediate 
aftermath of crises (see Lincoln and ex parte cases, Korematsu) do not inspire confidence 
that courts could be at all effective in arresting the sorts of constitutional changes brought 
on by crises.  Courts are widely perceived as ineffective even as symbols (Rosenberg), 
much less as powerful enough institutions to combat executive and/or legislative 
overreaching, being prone to be taken over by special interests themselves (Hirschl).  
What’s more, many would argue that judicial action that claims to preserve the 
constitution against elected representatives of the people could be far worse than judicial 
inaction (Bickel, Horowitz, Manfredi).  
Yet there is an arena in which action by constitutional courts is largely recognized 
as legitimate: the protection of rights.  Although constitutions are far more than the rights 
that they protect in the narrow sense, in a much broader sense, constitutions are meant 
solely to protect rights.  The rule of law is the right of man under the social contract 
(Locke).  Freedom from tyranny—tyranny that is often exercised when institutions like 
the separation of powers and stability of law are threatened—is a right (American 
founders, Lon Fuller).  Rights of this sort, often referred to as “first-generation” rights, 
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are unquestioned by modern liberal democratic orders.  More and more, “second” and 
“third” generation rights—those including the rights to human dignity, freedom from 
oppression on a much wider scope, education, health care, and human fulfillment—are 
being enforced by courts, particularly in advanced democracies outside of the United 
States.  If protection of these rights is seen as the purview of constitutional courts even by 
people who do not elect the members of those courts, then it seems possible—and 
perhaps even reasonable—to imagine that said courts could indeed protect these rights in 
times of crisis.   
Passing this responsibility to courts is not ideal.  Ideally, all branches of 
government would have a Lincolnian understanding of protecting the constitution and all 
branches would be involved.  Unfortunately, with courts being allowed to increase their 
powers of adjudication in many different arenas also comes the idea that executives and 
legislatures can act and then simply wait for the true authority on constitutions to step in 
and correct any problems.  Undoubtedly this cripples not just the care executives and 
legislatures take in upholding the constitutions that supposedly rule over them, but also 
the image these bodies show to the people.  This, surely, is not the only reason for overly 
litigious societies like America, for it is obvious that much of that is people wanting what 
they want when they want it and abusing their legal rights to get ahead, but I would 
imagine that having the court seen as the most likely protector of individual rights and the 
constitution itself does propel more individuals in crisis towards the court rather than 
their local representative.   
These are serious problems, but in examining the interplay between different state 
actors, it does appear that constitutional courts may still have the best ability to safeguard 
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the constitution—if only because most people think that it is the court’s responsibility to 
tell the people what the constitution means.  Even if the idea of a court having such a 
heavy responsibility in that area is a myth, it is still a powerful one.  Even though courts 
are not seen as impartial as they were a century ago, even those who feel they have been 
slighted by judicial ideology have abandoned neither the legal system nor the constitution 
that established it.   
In reading Schmitt, we find a surprisingly compelling, yet terribly frightening, 
account of what a state’s response to emergencies should be.  But what, as the Austrian 
mathematician, Kurt Gödel asked1, prevents our order from being reconstituted by a new 
decision by an ambitious sovereign-esque executive?  Who prevents the kind of human 
rights catastrophes seen not merely in Guantanamo Bay, but in the Nazi concentration 
camps Giorgi Agamben emphasizes in his Homo Sacer? 
This is of particular importance given the consensus in political theory and history 
from the Greeks to present that Schmitt is correct in stating “Like every other order, the 
legal order rests on a decision and not on a norm” (9).  We are well aware that 
Machiavelli’s Romulus and Brutus made decisions to create the Roman kingship and 
                                                 
1 Kurt Gödel famously was on the brink of attaining U.S. citizenship when he discovered 
that the Constitution could not prevent its own degeneration into dictatorship.  It was 
largely the influence of Einstein and Morgenstern that kept him in line during his 
citizenship tests.  See Morgenstern’s memorandum to this fact at: 
http://1372721354610204262-a-jeffreykegler-com-s-
sites.googlegroups.com/a/jeffreykegler.com/morgenstern-
document/Home/files/Morgenstern_onGoedelcitizenship.pdf?attredirects=0&auth=ANo
Y7cp-XyOzuqLWrtZGqkKH8QWa5x6KwF_-
UYec2JOo783bbH4_kfVTGm2mgPgdTfv7z2tl_MjsAPyr9tO_M0IzfxbkEVcr0r5g6Zf8K
XUMoI2MzbnvjbHe09SyS_gMrWz1vjudKsmphykzF12BI27pD_F321Xow38-
F7F9f8g18DEp5QZ2V37bI51mj-ZvA0ZUHlJJHoYlEA3LhIlkxtNs-
9w0awLRk3c80bOrzwAZc1JO3SN3p_0G9O4LLl3LTpZ6M_wzvkS3 
(Accessed 6 April 2009) 
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republic respectively, just as we are aware that the rebelling colonists in the American 
colonies, whose position is well represented by Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of 
Independence, were guided by a decision, not a norm.  Perhaps more perturbing is that 
the founders in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were also acting as decisionists, 
largely led by James Madison, to abandon the norms established in the Articles of 
Confederation. 
 Despite the decisionist elements of American constitutionalism, however, it seems 
fair to say that we are still governed by fairly strong norms and that decisions are not 
univocal from one sovereign, coming rather from the President and various executive 
agencies, Congress, and the Supreme Court, as well as various state and local organs.
 What I have written above is more than a mere introduction to the importance of 
Schmitt and Agamben, but also to the key question here: is there an institution in 
government that can be deployed to separate power so that a sovereign executive cannot 
effectively become Schmittian, thus preventing the catastrophes Agamben devotes his 
work to explaining?  Perhaps high constitutional courts might be best placed to curtail 
this problem of the executive, provided that the court is endowed with enough historical 
and practical power to rouse the consciousness of the people to prevent them from being 
bamboozled by Schmittian executives.  It is not in America that I find such a court, 
because the Supreme Court usually denounces executive overreaching too long after the 
crime has been committed to be effective, but rather in Germany.   
 German history, which includes the Weimar era battle between Schmittian 
existential constitutionalism and Hans Kelsen’s legal positivist model, the rise of Hitler 
(and Schmitt’s support of Hitler as sovereign), the horrors of the concentration camps, 
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and finally the creation of a sort of Kantian Basic Law, provides a potential alternative to 
the more open American court system.  As a result, I believe it is important to consider 
whether provisions like Article 2 of the Basic Law, which ensures the fundamental right 
to human dignity to all Germans, might be able to arrest the biopolitical human rights 
collapse that Agamben projects will happen in modern democratic orders.  This is not to 
say that Germany is perfect or totally inclusive (their treatment of the Turkish people 
within their borders is evidence enough of that), but that their constitutional order and the 
power of their Constitutional Court might be able to stop terrible excesses of the German 
Chancellor. 
 A recent German Constitutional Court case that shows this possibility is what I 
will refer to as the German Aviation Case (Judgment 15 February 2006—1BvR 357/05).2  
This case calls into question the constitutionality of several provisions of the Aviation 
Security Act, whose §14.3 allows  
direct use of armed force against the aircraft is permissible only if the occurrence 
of an especially grave accident cannot be prevented even by such measures.  This, 
however, only applies where it must be assumed under the circumstances that the 
aircraft is intended to be used as a weapon against human lives, and where the 
direct use of armed force is the only means to avert this danger (Grounds A:14). 
 
This provision allows the Chancellor or the Federal Minister of Defense to authorize 
shooting down airplanes thought to be weapons against human lives, and allows them to 
sacrifice the human lives on board to do so.  The Court rules  
33.  1.  The constitutional complain is admissible.  The complainants’ 
fundamental rights are directly violated by the challenged regulation.  Because 
they frequently use planes for private and professional reasons, the possibility that 
they could be affected by a measure pursuant to §14.3 of the Aviation Security act 
is not merely a theoretical one. 
                                                 
2 This case can be found in English at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20060215_1bvr035705en.html    
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34.  2.  The constitutional complaint is also well-founded.  The Aviation Security 
Act infringes the complainants’ fundamental rights to human dignity and to life 
pursuant to Article 1.1 and Article 2.2 sentence 1 of Basic Law.  The Act makes 
them mere objects of state action.  The value and preservation of their lives are 
left to the discretion of the Federal Minister of Defense according to quantitative 
aspects and to the life span presumably remaining to them ‘under the 
circumstances.  In the case of an emergency, they are intended to be sacrificed 
and to intentionally be killed if the Minister presumes, on the basis of the 
information available to him or her, that their lives will only last a short time and 
that, in comparison with the losses which are imminent otherwise, they therefore 
are no longer of any value at all or are, at any rate, of reduced value (emphasis 
mine, citations included in text). 
 
Sections 35 and 36 reiterate the same concerns—namely, that the prioritization of some 
lives over other lives is thoroughly unacceptable and legally incompatible with human 
dignity.  As I see it, this ruling is a repudiation of Agamben’s claim that all democratic 
states have reduced their citizens to living as homo sacer (14).  Some might say that the 
decision of the Court is the same as the decision of an executive, and that this result, 
though far more palatable than decisions made by Schmittian executives, is nothing more 
than a new mold for the sovereign.  But I believe this is not the case.  If my preliminary 
analysis of the German system is correct, then the court does have actual power.  If so, 
neither Chancellor and Ministers, nor Parliament, nor Court can be the sovereign: they 
divide power amongst themselves, some winning some struggles, others not.  
Decisionism is therefore impossible with the existence of checking institutions imbued 
with actual power. 
 In the end, though I am well aware that it may be the case that neither American 
nor German courts are well suited to combat the problems inherent to liberal 
constitutionalism announced by Carl Schmitt, it also appears that we cannot just ignore 
his incisive analysis and hope for the best.  This is especially true if we consider 
arguments like Michael Paulsen’s, where the executive is seen as even more powerful 
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than current politicians would admit.  As Paulsen argues: “The Constitution itself 
embraces an overriding principle of construction for the document’s specific provisions 
that may even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific constitutional 
requirements” (Gross and Aolian, 50).  Furthermore, “in that respect, necessity is not 
only part of the constitutional order.  It is ‘the first and originary source of law’” (Gross 
and Aolain, 50).  If Paulsen is correct, then the German lawmakers were right to give the 
executive such extreme power.   
 The question then becomes one of prioritization of rights and survival, which is 
the basic balance in the German Aviation case.  Should a country protect itself from 
terrorists (assuming, of course, that the method the Bundestag invented would actually 
work, which is in question), or protect fundamental human rights?  Furthermore, is there 
a balancing test that could be applied that would improve our chances of being able to 
achieve both ends?  Paulsen proposes such a test, saying that the executive power should 
have the equivalent of the Court’s balancing tests when necessity compels the executive 
to go outside of the law.  As he states, however, “Unfortunately, however, what the courts 
hold sufficient to constitution such a ‘compelling interest’ often falls well short of what 
one might think to be true necessity, in the sense of an urgent need to protect the nation or 
its people from devastating events” (Paulsen, 1286).  This means in Paulsen’s schematic 
that the Court’s protecting basic human rights, such as in the German Aviation Case, has 
analogous tests with the executive.   
 The question we are left with from Paulsen’s analysis, as well as the decision 
from the Bundestag, is what is necessity?  How can we know a situation reaches that 
threshold, and who should be the constitutional actor to remedy the situation?  I have 
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argued here that in the case of rights, the constitutional courts should have jurisdiction, 
but only protection of rights does not a legal system make.   
 
 
